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Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal 
contribution of multinational enterprises†
Richard Bolwijn, Bruno Casella and Davide Rigo*
Tax revenues from multinational enterprises (MNEs) are an important source of 
public finance in developing economies. The research and policy debate so far 
have mostly focused on the “missing” part, i.e. the government revenues lost due 
to the tax avoidance practices of MNEs (Bolwijn et al., 2018). In this study, we take 
a different, but complementary, approach, looking at the taxes and other revenues 
actually paid by foreign affiliates of MNEs to developing-country governments. 
We present two alternative methodologies to estimate foreign affiliates’ fiscal 
contribution – the contribution method and the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
income method – and show that they lead to the same order of magnitude. The 
findings allow us to set a baseline for an informed discussion on tax avoidance by 
MNEs.
Keywords: multinational enterprise, fiscal contribution, BEPS, domestic revenues, 
developing countries
1. Introduction: objective and scope of the analysis
The main goal of this study is to arrive at a meaningful order of magnitude for the fiscal 
contribution of foreign affiliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to developing 
economies. The definition of “fiscal contribution” in this context encompasses 
all types of payments by foreign affiliates to host country governments, including 
taxes, social contributions and other revenues. 
The analysis boils down to the estimation of three metrics: (a) the share of 
government revenues paid by foreign affiliates in total government revenues; (b) 
the share of government revenues paid by foreign affiliates in government revenues 
† This paper draws on the technical background paper accompanying the World Investment Report 
2015, chapter V “International Tax and Investment Policy Coherence”, prepared under the guidance of 
James X. Zhan. The authors benefited from comments provided by David Bradbury, Krit Carlier, Steve 
Clark, Alex Cobham, Lorrain Eden, Martin Hearson, Jan Loeprick, Ruud de Mooij and Thomas Neubig. 
The authors are responsible for all the remaining errors. 
* Richard Bolwijn and Bruno Casella are at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
Davide Rigo is at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. The 
corresponding author is Bruno Casella (bruno.casella@unctad.org). The views expressed in this article 
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations.
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paid by the corporate sector; (c) the absolute amount of government revenues paid 
by foreign affiliates. Revenues paid by MNEs to home countries are excluded from 
the analysis.
The analytical effort is relevant to a number of current policy debates:
•  On the financing of the Sustainable Development Goals, it helps to size the 
potential role of MNEs in mobilizing domestic resources for development.1
•  On base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), it helps to draw a baseline to assess 
the weight of the tax leakage relative to the tax contribution. The goal is to 
compute the fiscal contribution after profit shifting, i.e. it targets what foreign 
affiliates actually pay (based on what they report) after BEPS has taken place.
•  To measure BEPS, it is helpful to understand the relative sizes of the categories 
of MNE contributions when estimating the impact of different BEPS schemes.
Despite the relevance of the research question, to our knowledge no previous 
studies quantify the fiscal contribution of foreign affiliates to developing economies 
in a systematic and comprehensive fashion. The most likely reason for this gap is 
the scarcity of data on taxes paid by foreign affiliates in general, and in developing 
economies in particular. Most MNEs do not report taxes and other financial 
information at the level of their foreign affiliates.2 Increasing pressure for country-
by-country reporting may significantly improve information availability in the near 
future, but at the moment, access to relevant data on the operations and financials 
of foreign affiliates is still highly problematic.3 
There are two main sources of information on taxes paid by foreign affiliates. 
The ORBIS database from Bureau Van Dijk collects financial and business 
1 The World Investment Report 2014 focuses on the role of FDI in mobilizing external sources of 
development financing in terms of private investments into the Sustainable Development Goals; this 
study complements that perspective highlighting the role of FDI in mobilizing domestic resources. 
2 MNEs in general do not have the obligation to report detailed business and financial information on their 
foreign affiliate activities. Recently, in the face of mounting pressure for tax transparency, an increasing 
number of MNEs are voluntarily opting to disclose tax information on their foreign operations. 
3 Country-by-country reporting has been a longstanding pillar of tax transparency advocacy (see, for 
example, the Tax Justice Network website, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/country-
by-country). It makes it possible to detect distortions and misalignments in business and financial 
indicators of foreign affiliates, potentially indicating profit-shifting practices. In the context of the 
BEPS-G20 process, countries agreed on a new standard for MNEs to report their economic activities 
(including profits and tax payments) to the tax authority on a country-by-country basis. However this 
measure per se would not increase access to foreign affiliate information for the broad public, as 
transparency remains confined to one-to-one communication with the tax authority. Aside from the 
BEPS project, other ongoing transparency initiatives provide useful complementary information on 
the activity of MNEs in their countries of operations. A notable example is the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, supporting member countries (participation is on a voluntary basis) in the full 
disclosure of company payments and related government revenues from oil, gas and mining activities. 
A review of corporate transparency initiatives currently in place appears in PwC (2013).
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information from balance sheet and P&L data for over 100 million companies 
worldwide. It is by far the largest compiler of firm-level data. More crucially, it is the 
only firm-level database providing comprehensive information on the ownership 
structure of companies; this makes it, de facto, the only option when the analytical 
focus is on MNEs and the operations of their foreign affiliates. However, in particular 
for developing regions, ORBIS suffers from severe problems of inadequate 
coverage and availability of financial information.4 More specifically, whereas 
MNE financial information is usually available at the group level with some details 
(especially in the case of publicly listed MNEs from developed countries), reporting 
of unconsolidated financials on MNE foreign affiliates is extremely poor (see, for 
example, the discussions in Cobham and Loretz (2014) and Tørsløv et al. (2018)).   
Examples of studies using ORBIS to analyse the tax dynamics of MNEs in developing 
countries include Markle and Shackelford (2012, 2013), Fuest et al. (2012), and 
Cobham and Loretz (2014). The studies of Markle and Shackelford and Fuest et 
al. apply econometric techniques to a sample of firms extracted from ORBIS to 
analyse taxation of MNEs, either by comparing MNEs with domestic firms or by 
comparing MNEs with different features. More specifically, Markle and Shackelford 
(2012, 2013) use consolidated data from ORBIS to analyse factors influencing 
business groups’ effective tax rates (ETRs) – taxes paid over pre-tax profit reported 
by ORBIS – for a sample of both developed and developing countries. Interestingly 
they find no evidence of a substantial difference in the ETR between domestic 
companies and MNEs, whereas within the group of MNEs, the locations of the 
subsidiaries (in financial centres versus in other countries) matter. Also, Fuest et 
al. (2012) explore the determinants of ETRs, based on a sample of ORBIS data 
focusing specifically on developing economies. Results confirm that being part of 
an MNE does not play a significant role in determining the ETR (unlike institutional 
factors such as the level of corruption).
Cobham and Loretz take a more policy-oriented perspective, where the goal is 
to analyse the potential impact on countries of a change in the tax system, from 
the current system of separate accounting to one of unitary taxation. In particular, 
on the basis of financial and operational data extracted from ORBIS on a sample 
of foreign affiliates worldwide, the paper simulates how the tax base and the tax 
revenues would re-partition across countries if various apportionment formulas are 
4 According to preliminary findings from UNCTAD, in 2015 ORBIS reported some 2,600 foreign affiliates 
operating in Africa. For some smaller African countries, it recorded implausibly low numbers (e.g. 
Burundi, 3 foreign affiliates; Benin, 8; the Congo, 15). In addition, out of the 2,600 foreign affiliates 
identified, more than 2,100 (more than 80%) either do not report tax data at all or report negative or 
null values. For other indicators, such as turnover or employment, the coverage does not improve 
substantially (with data unavailable for 65% of turnover and almost 80% of employment). As a further 
benchmark, the Zambian Central Bank surveyed 126 active foreign affiliates in 2013, whereas an 
UNCTAD extraction from ORBIS returned only 36 entries.
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applied. Although data coverage is problematic for developing countries, the paper 
finds that apportioning profits according to measures of actual economic activity 
would result in a major redistribution of the tax base at the expense of specific 
jurisdictions, and in most cases towards the lower-income countries in the sample. 
The second source of data on taxes paid by foreign affiliates is collected through 
national surveys. These foreign affiliates’ statistics (FATS) include (a) statistics on 
the activity of affiliates operating in the reporting country (inward FATS), and (b) 
statistics on the activity of foreign affiliates of parents based in the reporting country 
(outward FATS). Since only a limited number of developed countries produce 
these surveys, when the object of the analysis is the activity of foreign affiliates in 
developing economies, the most relevant data are the outward FATS of developed 
countries (e.g. activity in developing economies of United States–headquartered 
MNEs). The coverage of FATS in terms of reporting economies depends on the 
financial indicators of interest. For “taxes paid” by foreign affiliates, complete FATS 
information is reported essentially only by the United States Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).5 Existing studies on MNE taxation that are based on FATS data are 
almost exclusively limited to foreign affiliates of United States MNEs. For a useful 
overview of issues related to the collection and interpretation of BEA FATS data on 
taxation, see Yorgason (2009). For applications of BEA tax data, see for example 
Clausing (2009)6 or IMF (2014).7 
Unlike previous studies, the goal of the analysis in this study is to comprehensively 
“size a population”, i.e. to measure the total amount of taxes paid by all foreign 
affiliates in developing economies, rather than to explore the properties of 
a population (for example, tax behaviours of MNEs) by generalizing from a 
reasonable but limited sample of firms. For this purpose, the coverage issues of 
the tax information in ORBIS and FATS are even more challenging. In addition, it 
is important to recall that both ORBIS and the BEA FATS capture only a portion of 
5 Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts (http://www.bea.gov/international/); 
see also Barefoot (2012). The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (http://www.meti.
go.jp/english/statistics/) reports some, albeit partial, data on taxation of foreign affiliates.  
6 Clausing (2009) leverages BEA data to analyse international profit-shifting practices of United States 
MNEs. The paper investigates how the profitability of foreign affiliates of United States MNEs varies 
with tax rate differentials. Results confirm a responsiveness of MNEs to tax rate differentials, both in 
the form of financial profit shifting (stronger effect) and in the form of real profit shifting (more moderate 
effect). 
7 Similar to Cobham and Loretz (2014), IMF (2014) runs a simulation of the effect of a shift towards 
formula apportionment but using BEA outward statistics on United States MNEs rather than ORBIS 
data. Empirical evidences suggest that developed economies would systematically receive a 
larger portion of taxable base to the detriment of so-called conduit economies (Bermuda, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland). However, for developing economies the 
picture is more nuanced: they would “gain” tax base only if the apportionment formula places heavy 
weight on employment. 
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the total fiscal contribution by foreign affiliates.8 It is not surprising that in a context 
where the availability of data on the P&L-transparent component, the corporate 
income tax, is poor, data on other contribution items (“above the line”) are barely 
existent. The Doing Business total tax contribution approach developed by the 
World Bank jointly with PwC9 circumvents the issue by computing by-country total 
tax corporate contributions on a pro forma basis instead of using actual data.10 
This approach captures differences in the tax regimes of different countries and 
makes possible the assessment of the fiscal burden borne by the average firm 
across countries and regions, but it provides limited insights on the size of the total 
contribution (a function not only of the tax regime in place in a country, but also of 
the volume and distinctive features of the business activities performed).11
This study takes a stepwise approach that does not directly use information on 
taxes and other government revenues paid by foreign affiliates, subject to the major 
data constraints just discussed. The initial data inputs are government revenues 
data reported by countries; from these, the approach zooms in on overall corporate 
contributions (domestic and foreign), and finally on foreign affiliate contributions 
(figure 1). Such an approach ensures that margins of error in estimations are 
confined at each step along the way. Nevertheless, as the data available on foreign 
operations and tax payments of MNEs are limited and fragmented, the analytical 
approach has been heuristic, employing a variety of sources and methods to 
converge towards a meaningful order of magnitude of MNE contributions. 
Section 2 derives a convenient representation of the average government revenue 
collection (size and composition of government revenues as shares of GDP) in 
developing countries from available government finance data (step 1 in figure 1). 
Section 3 shows how to allocate government revenues, according to the payer, 
either to business or to individuals and consumers; the objective is to size the 
corporate contribution (step 2). Section 4 estimates the portion of the corporate 
contribution borne by foreign affiliates (step 3). The calculation is performed 
employing two methods, leading to comparable results: the economic contribution 
method, presented in section 4.1 and the FDI income method, presented in 
8 In ORBIS this portion is limited to the corporate income tax, whereas the BEA also reports an additional 
category, “taxes other than income and payroll taxes”; however, it is too aggregated to provide 
meaningful information on the contribution side. The category is also defined as “indirect business 
taxes” and includes a variety of taxes, such as sales taxes, value added taxes, excises, property taxes, 
international trade taxes and so on. For the purpose of establishing the taxes borne by foreign affiliates, 
it is too aggregated as it also encompasses some taxes collected but not paid, e.g. value added taxes.
9 See World Bank and PwC (2015).  
10 The approach uses a case scenario to measure the taxes and contribution paid by a standardized 
business under each country’s tax regime. 
11 In particular the prototypical company driving the Doing Business calculation is defined as a domestic 
small to medium-size company, and thus potentially very different from the average foreign affiliate of 
a multinational group.
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section 4.2. The results of the three-step procedure are summarized in section 5, 
where they are presented both as stand-alone findings and, as baseline indicators, 
in relationship to UNCTAD estimations of revenue losses (from Bolwijn et al., 2018, 
in Part 1 of this Special Issue). Section 6 highlights some limitations of the approach 
and discusses ideas for future development. 
2. Size and composition of government revenues 
From available national accounts data, we derive a meaningful representation 
of government revenue collection in developing economies. In this context, 
government revenue collection refers to the average size (measured as a share 
of GDP) and composition (at a convenient level of granularity of the revenue 
components) of all revenues collected by governments. The average values for the 
various country groupings are then computed from national government revenue 
data, after weighting each country according to its GDP.  
For cross-regional analysis the most relevant global sources of government revenue 
data are the International Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics (IMF GFS) 
database and the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) Government 
Revenue Dataset (ICTD DB).12 All these datasets face an obvious trade-off between 
the granularity of the revenue structure and country coverage. Such a trade-off can 
12 The first version of the ICTD DB was released in September 2014. For a detailed description of it, see 
Prichard et al. (2014). 
Figure 1. Overview of the methodology
Size and breakdown
of government
revenues
Size/share of
corporate
contribution
Foreign afliates
contribution
Method a: Economic 
contribution method
Foreign afliates
contribution
Method b: FDI income 
method
Cross-check
Perimeter: all revenue items (taxes, social contributions, grants, other revenues); 
developing economies; reference year 2012.
1 2
3a
3b
Source: UNCTAD.
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be particularly penalizing for developing economies, where information available 
from national governments is more limited. 
The goal is to select a reference database that guarantees acceptable country 
coverage at a meaningful level of granularity (i.e. at a level of granularity most 
appropriate for the research questions). 
The ICTD DB presented the most attractive balance between granularity and country 
coverage for developing economies. It captures data from about 120 developing 
countries, the largest available perimeter among government revenue databases. 
As explained in Prichard et al. (2014), the ICTD DB also has a number of other 
advantages related to consistent treatment of revenue information across countries 
and regions as well as a focus on natural resource revenues. Occasionally, our 
methodology also makes use of the IMF GFS dataset as a complementary source 
to extract relevant information that ICTD DB does not report. At the time of the 
analysis (2015), the main limit of the ICTD DB was related to timeliness: the most 
recent year for which it presents a consistent and rich set of revenue data was 2009 
(whereas, for example, most IMF GFS data were reported up to 2015).13 However, 
validation procedures comparing the ICTD DB 2009 with the IMF GFS 2009 and 
2012 show significant alignment in the government revenue collection for various 
country groupings across time. Table 1 reports the results of the comparison for 
developing economies. The most visible difference is the higher weight assigned 
by the ICTD DB to “Other revenues” at the expense of “Taxes”. This is due to a 
systematic reallocation of the natural resource revenue items from “Taxes” to “Other 
revenues” performed in the ICTD DB.14
Data provided by the ICTD DB (2009) make it possible to explore government 
revenue collection at the global or the regional level in great detail. Such analysis 
reveals large variations in government revenue collection between countries and 
regions. A key driver for such variations is the level of income of economies (figure 
2). High-income countries collect about 40% of GDP in taxes, social contributions 
and other revenues, low-income countries less than 20%. Looking at economic 
groupings and regions reveals a mixed picture because of heterogeneity between 
countries within each region. The weighted average collection ratio of developing 
countries is still more than 10 percentage points lower than that of developed 
countries. The 30% of GDP collected in Africa, which compares favourably with 
the developing-country average of 27%, is skewed by a few upper-middle-income 
13 Notice that as the other steps of the estimation process are set at 2011 or 2012, the implicit assumption 
here is that on average the size and composition of government revenue collected (as a share of GDP) 
for developing economies has not changed significantly between 2009 and 2012. This is in line with 
evidence from comparison with the IMF GFS 2012 data (see table 1).
14 For a more detailed discussion on the issue, see Prichard et al. (2014: 26).
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countries with above-average revenues (mostly due to income from natural 
resources) that make up for the much lower collection ratios in a large group of 
low-income countries. The lowest levels of revenue collection as a share of GDP 
are found among the least developed countries in Asia.
The breakdown in figure 3 confirms some distinctive elements of revenue 
composition in developing economies as compared with developed ones: (i) 
The substantial role of other (non-tax) revenues (which include, among others, 
royalties on natural resources, income on property and official development 
assistance or grants), particularly in Africa and LDCs (left-hand side of figure 3); 
(ii) the limited share of income taxes relative to other taxes such as indirect taxes 
and taxes on international trade (right-hand side); (iii) within income taxation, the 
prominence of corporate income taxes, almost twice the share of personal income 
taxes (as compared with one fourth in developed economies) (right-hand side of 
the figure).
Table 1.  High-level comparison between the ICTD DB and the IMF GFS database, 
share of GDP (Per cent)
ICTD DB 2009 IMF/GFS 2009 IMF/GFS 2012
Total taxes 16 17 18
Income taxes 5 6 7
Payroll 0 0 0
Property 1 1 1
Goods and services 8 9 9
International trade 1 1 1
Other taxes 1 0 0
Social contribution 3 3 3
Other revenues 8 5 6
Grants 0 0 0
TOTAL REVENUES 27 26 27
Source: UNCTAD elaboration from the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset and IMF GFS revenue data.
119Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises
Fi
gu
re
 2
. D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n
 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
as
 a
 s
ha
re
 o
f G
DP
, w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
 (P
er
 c
en
t)
18
21
29
41
3736
Lo
w
-in
co
m
e
co
un
tr
ie
s
Lo
w
er
-m
id
dl
e-
in
co
m
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s
Up
pe
r-
m
id
dl
e-
in
co
m
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s
Hi
gh
-in
co
m
e,
no
n-
OE
CD
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
OE
CD
Gl
ob
al
By
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d
th
e 
Ca
rib
be
an
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
ec
on
om
ie
s
As
ia
Af
ric
a
De
ve
lo
pi
ng
 e
co
no
m
ie
s
De
ve
lo
pe
d 
ec
on
om
ie
s
LD
Cs
M
em
or
an
du
m
 it
em
:
21
46
31
25
30
27
38
By
 re
gi
on
So
ur
ce
: U
NC
TA
D 
an
al
ys
is
, b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
IC
TD
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
ev
en
ue
 D
at
as
et
, r
el
ea
se
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
01
4,
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
ye
ar
 2
00
9.
120 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 25, 2018, Number 3
Fi
gu
re
 3
. C
om
po
si
tio
n 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
s,
 b
y 
re
gi
on
 (P
er
 c
en
t)
Co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
(%
)
Co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 ta
x 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
nl
y 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l t
ax
es
 (%
)
In
co
m
e 
ta
x 
co
m
po
ne
nt
Co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x
Pe
rs
on
al
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x
Go
od
s 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
tr
ad
e
Ot
he
rs
 
Ta
xe
s
So
ci
al
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
Ot
he
r r
ev
en
ue
s 
(e
.g
. r
oy
al
tie
s 
on
 n
at
ur
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s,
 g
ra
nt
s)
LD
Cs
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
ec
on
om
ie
s
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d
th
e 
Ca
rib
be
an
As
ia
Af
ric
a
De
ve
lo
pi
ng
 e
co
no
m
ie
s
De
ve
lo
pe
d 
ec
on
om
ie
s
Gl
ob
al
M
em
or
an
du
m
 it
em
:
515
46
162
53
605656
0
14
167
2
10
2523
49
32
23
31
45
30
1921
16
*202120
30
21
111
2
10
*
16
41
4
20
12
3934
41
31
6346
33
49
3537
21
27
4
61
0
602
12
57
14
7
121514
So
ur
ce
:  
UN
CT
AD
 a
na
ly
si
s,
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
IC
TD
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t R
ev
en
ue
 D
at
as
et
. 
No
te
:  
Th
e 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
is
 g
en
er
al
ly 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 IM
F 
GF
S 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n.
 H
ow
ev
er
 in
 th
e 
le
ft-
ha
nd
 g
ra
ph
, t
he
 c
at
eg
or
y “
ot
he
r r
ev
en
ue
s”
 in
cl
ud
es
 g
ra
nt
s 
(v
er
y 
sm
al
l, 
at
 1
.5
%
 o
f t
ot
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
in
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
ec
on
om
ie
s)
. I
n 
th
e 
rig
ht
-h
an
d 
gr
ap
h,
 in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s 
(c
or
po
ra
te
 a
nd
 p
er
so
na
l) 
re
fle
ct
 th
e 
IM
F 
ca
te
go
ry
 “t
ax
es
 o
n 
in
co
m
e,
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 c
ap
ita
l g
ai
ns
” (
“p
ay
ab
le
 b
y c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
” 
an
d 
“p
ay
ab
le
 b
y 
in
di
vid
ua
ls
”)
. T
he
 re
si
du
al
 c
at
eg
or
y 
“o
th
er
s”
 in
cl
ud
es
 ta
xe
s 
on
 p
ay
ro
ll 
an
d 
w
or
kf
or
ce
, t
ax
es
 o
n 
pr
op
er
ty
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 ta
xe
s.
 D
at
a 
w
ith
 (*
) a
re
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 v
er
y 
lim
ite
d 
co
ve
ra
ge
. 
121Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises
3. Government revenues paid by corporations
In the process of approaching the main target (i.e. the calculation of the fiscal 
contribution of foreign affiliates), as an intermediate step, we estimate the share of 
government revenues paid by firms. For each component of government revenues 
derived in the previous section, our methodology arrives at an estimate for the 
corresponding share paid by firms (“corporate share”). It is possible to identify three 
main cases (figure 4).
The most straightforward case (type 1 in figure 4, column 3) arises when the 
estimation of the corporate share follows directly from the definition of the revenue 
category, so that the entire category is treated as either borne by business 
(corporate share at 100%) or not borne by business (corporate share at 0%). This 
includes, but is not limited to, corporate income taxes (fully borne by companies) 
as opposed to personal income taxes (fully borne by individuals). Other items falling 
in this category are international trade taxes, employers’ social contribution and 
property income contribution (fully borne by business); and, on the other side, 
taxes on goods and services and employees’ social contribution (not borne by 
business).15 
In some cases (type 2 in figure 4), revenue items cannot be clearly allocated 
because they are too heterogeneous. They lie typically either at the lowest possible 
level in the government revenue classification (no further breakdown is available for 
their allocation) or at a level such that the more granular level exhibits too limited 
coverage to derive reliable statistics. Given the uncertainty about the allocation, the 
corporate share for these categories is set at 50%. As these categories represent a 
15 Although allocation in this category is relatively straightforward, it does involve simplifying assumptions. 
In particular, two caveats should be kept in mind. First, the allocation criteria are necessarily established 
a priori and apply equally to all jurisdictions. As such, they reflect the formal definition and the default 
application of the revenue category, but they do not accommodate exceptions or nuances related to 
the actual implementation of the tax legislation. For example, value added tax is treated as a tax fully 
borne by consumers (corporate share at 0%). This approach is valid in general, but it does not capture 
cases of irrecoverable value added tax, effectively borne by companies. Second, the full (100%) 
allocation to the corporate component should not be interpreted too strictly; it reflects the fact that the 
bulk of the revenue item is paid by business. This is the case for example for the revenue item “Property 
income” within “Other revenues”. In this approach “Property income” is fully allocated to business. 
However, it is a quite heterogeneous category, encompassing a number of subcategories, the most 
relevant being “Interest”, “Dividends” and “Rent”. Although a part of this is paid by individuals (e.g. 
public residential housing), it is reasonable to expect that in developing economies the lion’s share is 
financed by corporations, e.g. as natural resource-related fees or rents. This is particularly true for the 
ICTD DB where the corporate share of “Other revenues” is even larger due to the reallocation of natural 
resource revenues from the category “Taxes”. Similarly the assumption that taxes on “International 
trade” are largely paid by corporations follows from the prominent role that corporations and MNEs in 
particular play in international trade; UNCTAD estimates the share of trade involving MNEs at 80% of 
total trade (see World Investment Report 2013, p. 135).
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residual portion of government revenues (about 20% of total government revenues; 
see figure 4, column 2), this approximation, albeit rough, does not substantially 
affect the aggregate estimates. The last type (type 3 in figure 4) arises when its sub-
items have been allocated; hence the allocation of the overarching category follows 
algebraically from the corporate shares and the mix of the subcategories.
For each relevant revenue item, figure 4 shows (a) the relative weight in the average 
government revenue collection of developing economies (column 2), and (b) the 
key elements of the estimation of the corporate contribution, i.e. the item type 
(column 3), the corporate share (column 4) and the resulting corporate contribution 
(column 5), defined here as the share paid by the corporation over total government 
revenues.
The application of the corporate shares identified in figure 4 to economic groups 
confirms higher corporate contribution in developing countries (almost half of 
government revenues) compared with developed countries (one third) (figure 5). 
The difference is caused, as noted before, by higher revenues from corporate taxes 
(income taxes as well as taxes on international trade and other levies) and from 
other revenues, especially from natural resources and property. Relative to the 
size of economies however the corporate contribution to government revenues 
is surprisingly the same across developed and developing economies, at 13% of 
GDP. Higher corporate contribution in transition economies is due to relatively high 
income from natural resources and to the role of state-owned enterprises in the 
economy.
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Figure 5. Contribution to government revenues by rms, domestic and foreign 
 (Per cent)
Taxes Social contributions Other revenues
Contribution paid 
by firms as a share 
of GDP
Contribution paid by firms as a
share of government revenues   
27
20
11
13
7
5
13
11
23
22
10
13
Transition
economies
Developing
economies
Developed
economies
Global 13%
13%
13%
26%
37%
34%
47%
57%
Source: UNCTAD analysis, based on the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset; IMF GFS database as complementary source.
4.  The main goal: the estimation of fiscal contributions of 
foreign affiliates
The estimation of the fiscal contribution of foreign affiliates is a very challenging 
exercise. First, there are no directly available data on taxes paid by foreign affiliates 
at the country level. Second, in this setting, fiscal contribution is interpreted in a 
very comprehensive way, including all revenue items paid by foreign affiliates in 
developing countries. As already noted, in the context of developing countries, the 
extension to non-tax revenues (including rents and royalties on natural resources) is 
crucial for realistic estimation of foreign affiliates’ contribution. 
For robustness purposes, the estimation is carried out employing two alternative 
methods: (a) the economic contribution method (section 4.1), and (b) the FDI 
income method (section 4.2). Figure 6 summarizes the main features and the 
resulting estimates of the two methods.
4.1. Approach based on the economic contribution of foreign affiliates
It seems reasonable to assume that the portion of the corporate contribution 
attributable to foreign affiliates should reflect the economic value generated by those 
affiliates for the host economy (economic contribution). Economic value in this context 
must refer to reported economic value, i.e. economic value after profit shifting.
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As the corporate contribution consists of different and heterogeneous components, 
we employ multiple drivers of economic value creation. Each driver applies to 
the most appropriate components of the corporate contribution in order to best 
approximate the corresponding share paid by foreign affiliates. 
Figure 7 illustrates the idea. Selected drivers of value creation are profits, 
employment, exports and value added. Each driver is naturally associated with 
some revenue items.16 Finally, the last column reports for each driver the estimated 
share generated by foreign affiliates. Notice that value added (fourth bucket) is 
used as the default driver for the revenue categories that do not have a dedicated 
tailored driver. In the appendix we provide a comprehensive account of the empirical 
background behind the estimation of the foreign affiliate shares.
16 For taxes related to labour and social contributions (second bucket), the ideal driver would be 
remuneration of employees, for which only very limited data are available; thus employment was 
selected as the second-best option. It is plausible that MNEs pay on average higher salaries than 
domestic companies and that therefore using employment as a driver would understate the foreign 
affiliate’s fiscal contribution. This bias is addressed by rounding up the estimated foreign affiliate 
share of employment (at 6%–9%) to 10%. See exact figures in the appendix. As international trade 
taxation (third bucket) includes both taxes on import (import duties) and taxes on exports, and the 
two components cannot be easily separated, the driver “exports” is used here as a generic indicator 
of foreign affiliates’ penetration in trade.
Figure 6. Overview of the estimation of the foreign afliate contributions 
 for developing economies
Based on the economic 
contribution of FAs 
to host economies
Methods
FAs fiscal contribution
Billion US$
Based on by - country
BOP data on FDI income
“Top down”
approach
“Bottom-up”
approach
a
b
Estimate the share of economic 
activity generated by multinational 
FAs in developing economies 
(economic contribution analysis).
Align the FAs scal contribution to the 
estimated economic contribution
Estimate the corporate income taxes paid 
by FAs by applying suitable effective 
income tax rate to the FDI income.
Calculate the non-income component 
based on its estimated weight relative to 
the income component
725
730
Source: UNCTAD analysis, reference year 2012.
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Figure 8 builds on figure 4 and figure 7 and shows the whole sequence of calculations 
leading from revenue collection statistics to the estimate of the fiscal contribution 
of foreign affiliates. The estimated values presented here should be interpreted as 
orders of magnitude. They represent central values in range estimate intervals, 
due to approximations and limitations of the methodology (further explained in the 
last section, on limitations and areas for further research). The overall estimate of 
$725 billion is the midpoint of a range with a lower bound of about $650 billion 
and an upper bound of about $800 billion. Note that this level of approximation 
does not have a substantial impact on the relevance of the foreign affiliates’ 
fiscal contribution: (i) as a share of total government revenues, it falls in a range 
between 9% and 12%; and (ii) as a share of total corporate contribution, it falls in 
a range of 20%–25%.
Figure 7. Estimation of foreign afliates’ economic contribution 
 in developing economies
Prots Corporate income taxes1
Associated components of corporate contributionDrivers Share generated by FAs
Employment2
Taxes on payroll and workforce
Social contributions
Exports3 Taxes on iternational trade
Value added4
All other relevant gov. revenue items:
Other taxes (including property taxes)
Other revenues
25%
10%
50%
20%
Source:  UNCTAD elaboration on multiple sources. 
Note:  Other revenues include (non-tax) revenues from property income (mostly royalties) and the other items classified as “Other 
revenue” in the IMF GFS classification, namely “Sales of goods and services”, “Fines, penalties and forfeits”, “Voluntary 
transfers other than grants” and “Miscellaneous and unidentified revenues”. Grants are excluded a priori from this scheme 
as they do not involve any corporate contribution.
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4.2. Approach based on the FDI income
The FDI income method is driven by balance-of-payments (BoP) data on FDI 
income17 rather than government revenue data. It just borrows from the corporate 
contribution analysis of section 3 the estimation of the average mix of the corporate 
contribution. 
Figure 9 summarizes the key elements of the approach. The FDI income method is 
characterized by two building blocks: 
1.  It leverages BoP data on FDI income (equity component)18 to estimate the 
corporate income taxes paid by foreign affiliates, after applying a suitable 
effective income tax rate. 
2.  It exploits the estimation of the corporate contribution performed in step 2 
(section 3) to estimate the size of the non-income component relative to the 
income component.19 
The two building blocks are independent until the last step of the calculation where 
the weights of the different components from (2) are applied to the corporate 
income taxation paid by foreign affiliates from (1) in order to estimate the total fiscal 
contribution of foreign affiliates.
Unlike the economic contribution method, the FDI income method proceeds from 
the bottom to the top: it first estimates the fiscal contribution of foreign affiliates for 
each developing region and then sums the results to obtain the aggregate estimate 
for developing economies. The total fiscal contribution, at $730 billion, comes out 
as broadly consistent with the results of the economic contribution approach (at 
$723 billion, figure 8, last row). The estimate of the corporate income component 
of the fiscal contribution is also aligned (at $200 billion in figure 9, column 3; against 
$220 billion estimated by the contribution approach, figure 8, second row).20 
From a methodological perspective, the consistency of the two estimates of the 
corporate income component is particularly helpful because at this stage of the 
17 Country data available from IMF, BoP statistics.
18 The values of pre-tax FDI income are not directly retrievable from by-country BoP data. Instead, they 
are estimates obtained by applying to the total FDI stock of the region the average rate of return 
of the equity income for the reporting countries. Furthermore, as BoP-reported FDI income is by 
definition “after-tax” the determination of the pre-tax FDI income requires adding a (corporate income) 
tax component calculated using the average effective tax rates reported in column 2. 
19 The distribution of the corporate contribution by region is estimated following the same logic applied 
in figure 4 to developing economies. The only difference is that the average government revenue 
collection, i.e. the “starting point” (column 2 in figure 4), is calculated by region rather than for 
developing economies as a group. 
20 For the non-income component there are some moderate differences between the estimates because 
whereas the contribution mix resulting from the economic contribution method is specifically tailored 
to foreign affiliates, by construction, the contribution mix from the FDI income method inherits (from the 
procedure described in section 3) the contribution mix of the “average firm”.
129Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises
Fi
gu
re
 9
. E
st
im
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
af
l
ia
te
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
to
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
ec
on
om
ie
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
FD
I i
nc
om
e 
m
et
ho
d
Pr
e-
ta
x 
FD
I i
nc
om
e
(e
qu
ity
 p
ar
t),
 
Bi
lli
on
 U
S$
Co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x,
Bi
lli
on
 U
S$
Av
er
ag
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ta
x 
ra
te
, 
Pe
r c
en
t
Af
ri
ca
De
ve
lo
pi
ng
 A
si
a
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d 
th
e 
Ca
rib
be
an
18
7
64
5
97
4712
9
24
25
%
20
%
25
%
M
NE
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n,
 
Bi
lli
on
 U
S$
Co
rp
or
at
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ix
, 
Pe
r c
en
t
Co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x
Ot
he
r t
ax
es
So
ci
al
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
Ot
he
r r
ev
en
ue
s
∑ 
= 
20
0 
bn
 U
S$
∑ 
= 
73
0 
bn
 U
S$
Es
tim
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s 
pa
id
 b
y 
M
NE
s 
fo
re
ig
n 
af
fil
ia
te
s
Es
tim
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
w
ei
gh
t o
f 
th
e 
co
rp
or
ar
te
 in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s 
vs
 th
e 
ot
he
r c
or
po
ra
te
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ite
m
s
Es
tim
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
M
NE
 to
ta
l c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
by
 a
pp
ly
in
g 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 w
ei
gh
t t
o 
th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
xe
s
302629
13181
3
197
39
4957
1
85
49
0
15
0
1
x
=
2
So
ur
ce
:  
UN
CT
AD
. 
No
te
:  
M
in
or
 in
co
ns
is
te
nc
ie
s 
du
e 
to
 ro
un
di
ng
. 
130 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 25, 2018, Number 3
procedure the two calculations are independent, i.e. there is no overlapping of the 
two methodologies that may induce convergence in the results.
The two approaches should not necessarily lead to the same result. In fact, the FDI 
income method should in theory yield a lower estimate, given that it can take into 
account only the income on the foreign-owned part of directly invested enterprises, 
rather than the full income of foreign affiliates (although the difference should not be 
large, especially in developing countries).21
The value added by the FDI income method to the overall estimation process is 
twofold:
•  Due to data constraints, the economic contribution method becomes less reliable 
when the perimeter of the estimation is restricted from developing economies to 
developing regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean). In these cases, 
the FDI income method can provide more reliable regional estimates of the fiscal 
contribution of foreign affiliates, as it builds on data with better regional coverage.
•  Given the fact that it is largely exogenous, the FDI income method represents 
a valuable validity check to test the estimation performed by the economic 
contribution method, which, as explained above, is imperfect.
The most challenging step of the FDI income method is to “centre” correctly the 
ETRs by region (figure 9, column 2). The literature review for this study did not 
identify any prior studies that specifically target ETRs for foreign affiliates and only 
a few that address developing economies. Critically, even for the same region, 
the literature proposes different ETRs, sometimes covering a range as large as 
15%–30%, depending on the data source, the sample of firms and countries and, 
above all, the methodology used for the calculation.22 Clearly, such a large variability 
21 Interestingly, the estimation of the corporate income component from the FDI income method, at $200 
billion, against the $220 billion from the contribution method is consistent with the interpretation of 
the FDI income method as a lower bound. However, when calculating the non-income contribution 
items, the FDI income method applies the weights of the corporate contribution derived in step 2 
rather than the weights of MNE contribution from the contribution method in step 3.a (this serves 
the methodological purpose of keeping the FDI income and the contribution approaches separate). 
The use of different weights is responsible for the convergence of the final estimates; given corporate 
income taxation at $200 billion, if MNE contribution weights were applied to the FDI income method, 
the final estimate for MNE total contribution would be $660 billion, a proper lower bound to the $725 
billion derived with the contribution method.
22 There are two main approaches to the calculation of the ETRs: forward-looking and backward-
looking. Forward-looking metrics measure the tax burden on a pre-defined investment project. More 
specifically, they measure how taxes affect the cost of capital (i.e. the minimum required rate of return 
on an investment project). They are calculated on a stylized hypothetical investment and incorporate 
all the tax payments due over the lifetime of an investment, along with all the other cash flows of the 
investment projects. Backward-looking metrics are calculated as the plain ratio between corporate 
income tax payments and pre-tax income from reported accounting data. The two measures can 
lead to substantially different results, and this partially explains the variability observed in the literature 
between estimates of the effective tax rates.
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may have non-negligible repercussions on the final estimate. Examples of papers 
addressing ETRs for developing countries include Ali Abbas et al. (2012), Markle and 
Shackelford (2012, 2013) and Fuest et al. (2012).23 Ali Abbas et al. (2012) employs 
a forward-looking measure of the effective tax rate,24 while Markle and Shackelford 
(2012, 2013) and Fuest et al. (2012) resort to backward-looking approaches. The 
two studies of Markle and Shackelford are based on the notion of average effective 
tax rate (AETR), whereas that of Fuest et al. is based on the marginal effective 
tax rate (METR).25 As the purpose of this study is intrinsically descriptive, i.e. to 
derive a measure of corporate income taxation as close as possible to historical 
data, the backward-looking AETR approach of Markle and Shackelford, which is 
based on actual accounting data, seems the most appropriate. Thus, the ETRs 
employed in the estimation (figure 9, column 2) are substantially aligned with Markle 
and Shackelford (2012, 2013). Additional validation checks performed by UNCTAD 
on a sample of foreign affiliates from ORBIS also confirm these levels. The rounding 
of the ETRs at the 5 percentage point mark reflects the level of variability observed 
between the papers of Markle and Shackelford and the UNCTAD benchmark.
5. Summary results
The main result of the methodology described in the preceding sections is a 
comprehensive and multi-layered picture of the fiscal contribution of foreign 
affiliates: (a) covering both absolute contribution and contribution relative to the 
other actors in the economic system; (b) broken down by the main contribution 
items; and (c) including not only traditional tax items but also other revenues. Figure 
10 summarizes the key numbers qualifying the MNE fiscal contribution to developing 
countries, calculated according to the economic contribution method (but similar 
numbers would result from application of the FDI income method). Of almost 
$7 trillion annually received by developing countries as government revenues, just 
23 Also, Chen and Mintz (2013) and World Bank and PwC (2015), although they do not focus specifically 
on developing economies, provide effective tax rates for a number of developing countries as part of 
their annual ranking of countries’ effective tax rates.
24 Other examples of forward-looking approaches include Chen and Mintz (2013) and, to some extent, 
World Bank and PwC (2015). 
25 Although both Markle and Shackelford (2012, 2013) and Fuest et al. (2012) use a backward-looking 
formula, the approaches are different. In Markle and Shackelford, ETRs are calculated as the AETR 
within the sample of companies, i.e. the plain ratio between the sum of corporate income taxes paid 
and the sum of all the pre-tax reported profits. In Fuest et al., they are estimated through a regression 
model and are consequently interpreted as METRs; i.e. they represent the corporate income tax that 
would be paid (by the average company) on the marginal unit of profit. Resulting estimates may differ 
significantly as the first measure incorporates all the heterogeneity of the sample and the effect of the 
starting conditions, whereas the second is designed to net them off and capture the “pure” relationship 
between taxes and profits. Indeed, the values of the ETR estimated by Markle and Shackelford (roughly 
20–25%) turn out to be higher than the values estimated by Fuest et al. (at 10–15%).  
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less than half ($3.2 trillion) is paid by corporations. The foreign affiliates’ portion of 
the corporate contribution corresponds to about 20% or some $725 billion, the 
first key number in our calculation. The tax component, strictly speaking, amounts 
to 60% of foreign affiliates’ contribution ($430 billion), whereas the remaining part 
is made up of other revenues (mainly rent and royalties related to the use of natural 
resources). Finally, the share of foreign affiliates’ taxes covered by corporate income 
taxation is 50%, corresponding to $220 billion, our second main figure.
In addition to information on the breakdown of government revenues, figure 10 
provides a baseline to assess the relative scale of the revenue losses generated 
by MNE tax avoidance. A proliferation of revenue loss estimates in recent years 
(e.g. UNCTAD, 2015; Bolwijn et al., 2018; OECD, 2015; Crivelli et al., 2016; Tørsløv 
et al., 2018) has stimulated an intense discussion on the actual size of the value 
at stake (see, for example, the discussion in Forstater, 2015). To have an idea 
of the orders of magnitude, UNCTAD’s estimate of revenue losses for developing 
countries, at some $100 billion annually (Bolwijn et al., 2018), is comparable to the 
total annual amount of official development assistance (ODA) granted to developing 
economies (at $115 billion in 2012, according to OECD figures). 
However, it is more informative to assess the figure’s magnitude relative to some 
meaningful baseline. To this end, it is quite common in the literature to provide 
revenue loss estimates as shares of GDP or total corporate income tax (e.g. Crivelli et 
al., 2016; OECD, 2015). GDP and corporate income tax baselines can be retrieved 
from national accounts with no or minimal analytical elaboration. Although they may 
be useful for further qualifying the scale of the revenue losses, they primarily depend 
on the underlying structure of the economy (e.g. the relative mix between foreign 
and domestic business) rather than on the tax behaviours of MNEs. 
Hence, they are unable to help answer the most relevant questions: How much 
foreign affiliates avoid relative to what they should pay? How much foreign affiliates 
avoid relative to what they actually pay in total? The first question requires a 
quantification of corporate income tax currently paid by foreign affiliates; the 
second one, an estimate of all government revenues contributed by foreign 
affiliates, including corporate income tax, other taxes and other (non-tax) revenues. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to pursue both directions, resulting in 
a comprehensive estimation of the key baseline figures, as reported in figure 10. 
On the one side, revenue losses due to profit shifting and the avoidance of income 
taxes ($100 billion) is about half of the corporate income tax actually paid ($220 
billion); or, more meaningfully, foreign affiliates manage to avoid paying one third 
of the corporate income taxes theoretically due to governments in developing 
economies. This number, more than figures in absolute value, reveals the extensive 
use of tax avoidance practices by MNEs. On the other side, the ratio of revenue 
losses to total fiscal contribution (at 14%; i.e. $100 billion relative to $725 billion) 
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suggests that foreign affiliates significantly contribute to government collection 
in developing countries, even after profit shifting and revenue losses generated by 
tax avoidance. 
Clearly, these ratios refer to the aggregate picture and can’t be directly applied 
to individual countries, for example to size the impact of international or national 
tax measures to counter tax avoidance at the country-level. Impact can widely 
change depending on countries’ economies, size and exposure to global 
production. Yet, on a global scale, they expose the double imperative of stopping 
the severe leakage of government revenues due to tax avoidance on the one 
side, while preserving the revenue stream generated by MNE investment on the 
other. The balance between there two dimensions is at the core of the policy 
challenges addressed by UNCTAD in its guidelines for coherent international tax 
and investment policies (see World Investment Report, 2015; chapter V).
6. Limitations and areas for further research
This study is designed to provide an order of magnitude for the fiscal contributions 
of foreign affiliates and to stimulate further efforts aimed at consolidating and refining 
the estimate. It is possible to envisage a number of analytical areas of improvement 
and related avenues for future investigation. 
First, the most critical issue concerns the collection and exploration of operational 
statistics on the activity of foreign affiliates. Currently the economic contribution 
method relies primarily on FATS supported by a collection of heuristic and empirical 
evidence from a variety of other sources. Although the only consistent source of 
foreign affiliates data so far, FATS suffer from being driven exclusively by developed 
economies, either as investors (outward FATS) or as recipients (inward FATS). A 
more objective picture of the activity of foreign affiliates in developing economies 
requires complementing FATS with additional data. ORBIS is the natural and, in the 
short term, most feasible complement to FATS. However, analytical work needs to 
be done to define a methodology to select and clean ORBIS data in order to have 
a consistent set of foreign affiliates (ideally consistent with FATS data). In addition, 
robust imputation procedures are needed to complete the significant amount of 
missing data in developing economies. Collection of FATS data by central banks of 
developing countries, following some scattered examples such as those of Zambia 
(Bank of Zambia, 2014) or Thailand (Tattawasart, 2011), would considerably 
improve the information available, providing an inward FATS perspective on 
developing economies. Finally, public country-by-country reporting would mark a 
real improvement in the possibility to measure and monitor the activity of foreign 
affiliates in developing economies. 
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Second, another key issue relates to the identification of the effective income tax 
rate of foreign affiliates in developing economies. As explained earlier, the literature 
supports a range of options, leading to quite different results. In addition, a difficult 
question is whether differentiated rates should be used for foreign affiliates and 
domestic companies. As mentioned earlier, other studies have failed to find a 
significant difference in rates between domestic and foreign firms. An UNCTAD 
preliminary analysis through ORBIS, comparing AETRs of large samples of 
domestic companies and foreign affiliates from different developing regions, also 
does not reveal any systematic gap between the two groups. Moreover, ORBIS 
firm-level evidence suggests ETRs for developing regions that are aligned with (or 
slightly above) those found in similar studies (Markle and Shackelford, 2012, 2013).
As uniform ETRs for foreign affiliates and domestic firms may appear counterintuitive, 
two important points should be made:
i.  The fact that domestic firms and foreign affiliates are found to have similar ETRs 
does not preclude that MNEs, at the consolidated level, may have significantly 
lower ETRs due to BEPS. (ETRs are applied to the tax base that remains in foreign 
affiliates after profit shifting.)
ii.  Many developing countries provide fiscal incentives to MNEs, which (insofar as 
they lower the tax rate rather than the base) would normally imply lower ETRs 
for foreign affiliates compared with domestic firms. Although incentives may have 
a significant impact at the individual country level, at the aggregate level the 
empirical evidence does not show any effect. Better and more disaggregated 
data and further research will be needed to quantify the effect of fiscal incentives.
The economic contribution method does not directly use ETRs but assumes that 
the ETRs of domestic companies and foreign affiliates are aligned. Consistently, 
in the FDI income method, the ETRs used are not “tailored” to foreign affiliates 
but reflect the AETRs applied to firms in the regions. The issue is sensitive and 
open to debate and deserves renewed empirical effort;26 its implications, beyond 
this study, will be relevant for the ongoing policy discussion on tax incentives and 
development.
Third, a number of factors may lead to potential over- or under-estimation of 
foreign affiliate contributions. A factor leading to potential over-estimation lies in 
the derivation of profits via operating surplus (see explanation in the appendix). 
26 For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether ORBIS may suffer from a selection bias on 
companies reporting tax information (excluding from its monitor exactly those companies that pay low 
or no taxes). 
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Although operating surplus ratios constitute a generally accepted proxy for profit 
ratios in national account statistics, it cannot entirely eliminate some forms of profit 
shifting, in particular thin capitalization. A number of factors qualify this limitation:
•  The FDI income method, which does not present this problem (it is based on 
reported profits of foreign affiliates), is consistent with the 25% share of foreign 
affiliates in total corporate profits applied in the contribution method.
•  UNCTAD’s preliminary firm-level analysis based on ORBIS does not reveal a 
systematically higher foreign affiliate share in operating surplus than in profits. 
Conversely, a factor leading to potential under-estimation of the contribution, 
again related to the contribution method, is the treatment of “mixed income” in 
the calculation of the profit share from national account statistics. In particular, the 
contribution method presently does not strip out the non-corporate business income 
component from the baseline for the calculation of the foreign affiliate contribution. 
Removing non-corporate business income, which would be unlikely to contain 
any foreign affiliate contribution, would have the effect of increasing the foreign 
affiliate share in the remaining corporate income part, thereby increasing the foreign 
affiliate contribution rate. Simulation of this effect under a reasonable, conservative 
hypothesis of mixed income at 20% of total value added in developing economies27 
yields an upper-bound estimate for the total foreign affiliate contribution of about 
$800 billion. Other factors leading to potential over- or underestimation cannot be 
excluded a priori.
27 Country data on mixed income for developing countries are scarce. However, on the basis of available 
data and evidence from other studies (Guerriero, 2012; Trapp, 2015), a conservative assumption is 
mixed income at 20% of value added.
137Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises
References
Ali Abbas, S.M., A. Klemm, S. Bedi and J. Park (2012). “A partial race to the bottom: Corporate 
tax developments in emerging and developing economies”, IMF Working Papers, 12(28). 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Altomonte C., T. Aquilante, G. Békés and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2013). “Internationalization and 
innovation of firms: evidence and policy”, Economic Policy, 28(76): 663–700.
Bank of Zambia (2014). Foreign Private Investment and Investor Perceptions in Zambia. 
Lusaka: Bank of Zambia.
Barefoot, K.B. (2012). “U.S. multinational companies: Operations of U.S. parents and their 
foreign affiliates in 2010”, Survey of Current Business (2012): 51–74. 
Bolwijn R., B. Casella and D. Rigo (2018). “An FDI-driven approach to measuring the scale 
and economic impact of BEPS”, Transnational Corporations 25 (2): 107–143. 
Chen, D., and J. Mintz (2013). “2013 Annual global tax competitiveness ranking: corporate 
tax policy at a crossroads”, SPP Research Papers, 6(35). Calgary: University of Calgary 
School of Public Policy.
Clausing, K.A. (2009). “Multinational firm tax avoidance and tax policy”, National Tax Journal, 
65: 703–725.
Cobham, A., and S. Loretz (2014). “International distribution of the corporate tax base: 
Impact of different apportionment factors under unitary taxation”, ICTD Working Paper, 
27, April. Brighton, United Kingdom: International Centre for Tax and Development. 
Crivelli, E., R. de Mooij and M. Keen (2016). “Base erosion, profit shifting and developing 
countries”, FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 72(3), 268–301.
Forstater, M. (2015). “Can stopping tax dodging by multinational enterprises close the gap in 
development finance?”, CDG Policy Paper 069. Washington, DC. 
Fuest, C., G. Maffini and N. Riedel (2012). “What determines corporate tax payments in 
developing countries? Evidence from firm panel data”. Paper presented at the XXIV 
conference, Società italiana di economia pubblica, Pavia, 24–25 September. 
Guerriero, M. (2012). “The labour share of income around the world. Evidence from a panel 
dataset”. Paper prepared for the 4th Economic Development International Conference of 
GREThA/GRES, Inequalities and Development: New Challenges, New Measurements?, 
University of Bordeaux, France, 13–15 June. 
IMF (2014). “Spillovers in international corporate taxation”, IMF Policy Paper. Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Markle, K.S., and D.A. Shackelford (2012). “Cross-country comparisons of corporate income 
taxes”, National Tax Journal, 65(3): 493–528.
Markle, K.S., and D.A. Shackelford (2013). “The impact of headquarter and subsidiary 
locations on multinationals’ effective tax rates”, NBER Working Paper, No. 19621. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
OECD (2015). Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 – 2015 Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD Publishing).
138 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 25, 2018, Number 3
Prichard, W., A. Cobham and A. Goodall (2014). “The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset”, 
ICTD Working Paper, 19. Brighton, United Kingdom: International Centre for Tax and 
Development. 
PwC (2013). “Tax transparency and country-by-country reporting. An ever changing 
landscape”, October. 
Tattawasart, O. (2011). “Toward FATS and beyond: the case of Thailand”. Proceedings of the 
IFC Conference, Initiatives to Address Data Gaps Revealed by the Financial Crisis, IFC 
Bulletin, 34: 488–502.
Tørsløv, T.R., L.S. Wier, and G. Zucman (2018). “The Missing Profits of Nations”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 24701, National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.
org/10.3386/w24701.
Trapp, K. (2015). “Measuring the labour income of developing countries. Learning from social 
accounting matrices”, WIDER Working Paper, 2015/041. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
UNCTAD (1992). World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of 
Growth. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD (2012). World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment 
Policies. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD (2013). World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade 
for Development. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD (2014). World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. New 
York and Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD (2015). World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
World Bank and PwC (2015). “Paying Taxes 2015”. 
Yorgason, D.R. (2009). “Collection of data on income and other taxes in surveys of U.S. 
multinational enterprises”. Paper prepared for the 4th Joint Session of the Working Group 
on International Investment Statistics and the Working Party on Globalisation of Industry 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 8 October.
139Establishing the baseline: estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises
Appendix.  Estimating the contribution profile of foreign 
affiliates
There is no unique source that can provide a comprehensive picture (across the 
different drivers) of the economic contribution of foreign affiliates in developing 
economies; instead the estimation is the result of the enquiry of multiple sources 
that jointly form the contribution profile of foreign affiliates in developing economies 
(figure 7, column 3). The methodological choice to round the contribution shares at 
the 5 percentage point level reflects the expected degree of approximation of the 
estimate, as well as the ultimate objective of the analysis: to arrive at an order of 
magnitude estimation.28 
Employment (figure 7, item 2) and value added (item 4):
•  For employment and (gross) value added generated by foreign affiliates, outward 
FATS from the United States (BEA) and Europe (Eurostat) represent the primary 
sources of data. As existing outward statistics capture the activity of foreign 
affiliates only from a sample of investor countries (the United States and European 
Union (EU) countries), an up-scaling step is needed to extrapolate the worldwide 
data. Up-scaling is based on the shares of reporting (investor) countries in the FDI 
stock of developing economies. 
In order to calculate the contribution share, the indicator used as the baseline 
for employment is the total number of employees from International Labour 
Organization (ILO) statistics, targeting paid employees; for the value added it is 
the gross value added retrievable from UN National Accounts data. The reference 
year is 2011, the most recent year for which Eurostat outward data were available 
at the time of the analysis (the BEA reported also preliminary 2012 statistics).
•  The resulting estimates are the following: 
-  (2) Employment. Estimated share of employment generated by foreign affiliates 
in developing economies: (a) simple average: 9% (of which Africa, 10%; Asia, 
12%; Latin America, 6%), and (b) weighted average: 6% (of which Africa, 6%; 
Asia, 6%; Latin America, 5%). 
-  (4) Value added. Estimated share of value added generated by foreign affiliates 
in developing economies: (a) simple average: 21% (of which Africa, 21%; Asia, 
23%; Latin America, 20%), and (b) weighted average: 19% (of which Africa, 
22%; Asia, 20%; Latin America, 16%). 
28 Approximation of the contribution shares clearly affects the final estimation. The impact of 
approximations remains within the overall estimation interval from $650 billion to $800 billion.
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•  As a benchmark, it is also useful to consider the foreign affiliate share for developed 
economies, which can be retrieved using inward FATS from the BEA and 
Eurostat. Unlike outward statistics, these data have the advantage of providing an 
exhaustive picture of all foreign affiliates operating in each reporting country and, 
as such, they do not need up-scaling. On average the estimated foreign affiliate 
shares for both employment and value added do not differ significantly from 
the shares for developing economies (however, significant differences emerge 
between the EU and the United States). 
-  (2b) Employment – developed economies. Weighted average: 9% (of which EU, 
15%; United States, 5%);
-  (4b) Value added – developed economies. Weighted average:13% (of which EU, 
22%; United States, 9%).
Profits (item 1):
•  As outward FATS on profits are extremely scarce (virtually limited to the United 
States), an alternative argument is used, combining the preceding estimates 
of the foreign affiliate share for employment and value added with information 
retrievable from UN National Accounts statistics on the partition of the value 
added in developing economies. On average, the labour share of the value 
added generated in developing economies is about one third.29 Notice that 
in developed economies the picture is approximately inverted with the capital 
income component roughly at one third of the value added.30 In this context, 
given a foreign affiliate share of the labour component of the value added at 
10%, the corresponding share of the capital income component must be at 25% 
 
29 Guerriero (2012) finds a slightly higher share, at some 40% of the value added; such a difference does 
not substantially affect the final estimate. 
30 The split between the labour and capital components of the value added proposed by national accounts 
statistics for developing economies should be interpreted with caution. The capital component 
includes the mixed income generated by self-employment; this is a hybrid item that is allocated from 
an accounting perspective to the capital component but that economically pertains partially also to 
the labour component (as remuneration of labour). As this item is particularly relevant for developing 
economies, the effect tends to penalize the labour share in developing economies compared with 
developed ones. Guerriero (2012) recalculated the labour share using more sophisticated indicators 
that account for the mixed-income effect and found that the labour share for developing economies 
would increase significantly, reaching a level almost comparable with that of developed economies (at 
about 60%–70% of value added).
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to align the foreign affiliate share of the value added to the estimated 20%. The 
share in the capital income component is then taken as a proxy for the foreign 
affiliate share in total profits.31
•  Notice that with these shares of labour and capital income, the split of value 
added for foreign affiliates is even more skewed towards the capital income 
component than for domestic companies, exceeding 80% of the value added. 
This is arguably due to higher productivity of labour in foreign affiliates,32 as well 
as higher penetration in capital-intensive sectors.
•  As for employment and value added, foreign affiliate shares for developed 
economies that are based on inward FATS present values close to the estimated 
shares for developing economies. In particular, the estimation from Eurostat 
inward FATS on gross operating surplus for a number of European countries 
gives a weighted foreign affiliate share of 25% (30% as a simple average).
Exports (item 3):
•  Exports are also not systematically reported by FATS statistics. In addition, as 
exports are not a standard item of the balance sheet, coverage is also very limited 
in firm-level databases such as ORBIS. Nevertheless, leveraging insights from 
UNCTAD’s previous analyses, especially on global value chains (see WIR13), and 
integrating them with the scattered evidence available from individual countries, 
a conservative estimate of the foreign affiliate share is proposed, at about 50% of 
total exports from developing economies.
•  The World Investment Report 2013 (see figure IV.8) estimates that on average 
foreign affiliates generate some 35%–45% of the (domestic) value added 
incorporated in developing countries’ exports. The bulk of this value added is 
arguably part of foreign affiliates’ exports, so that the range represents a lower 
bound for the share of exports generated by foreign affiliates.33
31 This step entails some assumptions. In national accounts statistics, a generally accepted proxy of (pre-
tax) profits is the net operating surplus. Although the net operating surplus is the largest constituent of 
the capital income component of the value added, it is not the only one; depreciation and taxes and 
other subsidies also enter into the computation. The implicit assumptions here are that the share of 
foreign affiliates (at 25%) is the same for all the elements of the capital income component of the value 
added and that the share of foreign affiliates in profits is the same as in operating surplus. This caveat 
was discussed in the section on limitations and areas for further research.
32 Using firm-level data from a sample of European countries, Altomonte et al. (2013) show that the 
productivity of labour is higher for more internationalised firms. In developing economies this effect is 
expected to be even more pronounced.
33 The component to add on top of the 35%–45% share to obtain the foreign affiliate share in exports 
is the part of the domestic value added incorporated into foreign affiliate exports that is generated by 
domestic companies.
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•  The World Investment Report 2013 (figure IV.14) also states that about 80% 
of global trade involves MNEs, of which one third is intra-firm trade, one third 
arm’s length trade and the remaining third non-equity-mode-generated trade. It 
is reasonable to assume that the MNE share in trade in developing economies 
would be at least equally high and that the contribution of foreign affiliate exports 
to intra-firm trade and arm’s length trade would represent a major component of 
that share.
•  A number of studies at the level of individual countries also confirm the prominent 
role of foreign affiliates in trade.
-  Developing economies. Available information at the country level suggests a 
share of exports generated by foreign affiliates in developing economies equal 
to or higher than 50% of total exports.
•  In China in 2012, foreign affiliates accounted for 50% of exports and 48% of 
imports (see World Investment Report 2013, box IV.3).
•  In smaller countries the share may be significantly higher. From inward FATS 
data collected by Thailand’s national bank, in 2007 the share of exports 
generated by foreign affiliates was 75%, and the share of imports was 72% (see 
Tattawasart, 2011).
•  Similarly, the Bank of Zambia estimates the share of exports generated by 
foreign affiliates at 81.6% of total exports in 2013 (55.1% of imports) (see Bank 
of Zambia (2014)). 
-  Developed economies. For benchmark purposes it is useful to recall also the 
available data on the foreign affiliate share of exports for developed economies 
(expected to be substantially lower than developing economies).  
•  From World Investment Report 2013, box IV.3, the foreign affiliates in the 
United States accounted in 2010 for 20% of exports; in France they accounted 
for 34%. 
•  The OECD also reports some scattered statistics on foreign affiliates’ exports. 
In 2007 the foreign affiliate share in exports from European countries varied 
considerably: from 22% in Italy to over 50% in Poland and Estonia. 
-  Historical perspective. From a more historical, but still meaningful, perspective, 
the World Investment Report 1992 provides estimates of foreign affiliate shares 
in exports for a number of developing economies, documenting that, already in 
the late 1980s, those shares in many Asian and Latin American countries were 
over 25%–30%, with some peaks of 40%–50%.
